

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6552

INFO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECSTION 1 OF 3 BRASILIA 8811

LIMDIS

DEPT PLEASE REPEAT TOSEC FOR LORD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, XM, OTRA

SUBJECT: POLICY PLANNING GROUP VISIT TO SANTIAGO

REF: SANTIAGO 7076

SUMMARY: PRESIDENT PINOCHET'S INITIAL GREETING TO POLICY PLANNING TEAM ESTABLISHED THEME FOR MUCH OF SUBSEQUENT CONSULTATION. "WE HAVE BEEN BETTER ALLIES TO YOU THAN YOU HAVE TO US". THROUGHOUT TWO DAYS OF INTENSIVE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS WITH CABINET MINISTERS AND MILITARY CHIEFS OF STAFF, CHILEANS DEMONSTRATED COMPLETE PREOCCUPATION WITH PERCEIVED MILITARY THREAT FROM PERU BACKED BY DIRECT SOVIET SUPPORT; GLOBAL ANTI-CHILE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN ORCHESTRATED WHOLLY BY "INTERNATIONAL MARXISM", AND VERY SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROSPECTS OCCASIONED BY TRENDS IN OIL, FOOD, AND COPPER PRICES. LACK OF INTEREST IN REGIONAL OR HEMISPHERIC MATTERS WAS STRIKING. CHILE'S GOVERNMENT SEES ITSELF UNDER SIEGE ON MANY FRONTS; VIEWS ALL GLOBAL ISSUES FROM EARLY 1959'S COLD WAR PERSPECTIVE;
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BELIEVES IT IS DEFENDING U.S. INTERESTS AS WELL AS

ITS OWN AND HOPES FOR MORE TANGIBLE EXPRESSION OF U.S. UNDERSTANDING, SYMPATHY, AND SUPPORT. FONMIN PRESSED OPENLY AND DIRECTLY FOR AN EARLY ANSWER TO CHILE'S REQUEST PURCHASE DEFENSIVE WEAPON LIKE TOW. DISCUSSIONS WERE FRANK AND USEFUL TO BOTH SIDES, THOUGH TEAM DOUBTS IT MADE MUCH DENT ON CHILEAN LEADERS WORLD VIEW. END SUMMARY

1. PLANNING GROUP VISIT TO SANTIAGO NOVEMBER 17-20 WAS PLAYED IN HIGH KEY BY CHILEANS, IN CONTRAST TO LOW KEY TREATMENT ACCORDED BY PERUVIANS (REFTEL). CHILEAN PRESS, WITH GOVERNMENT SUPPORT AND DESPITE EMBASSY ATTEMPTS TO DISSUADE, GAVE CONSIDERABLE COVERAGE TO THE "KISSINGER MISSION".

2. INITIAL COURTESY CALL ON PRESIDENT PINOCHET OPENED TALKS ON NOVEMBER 17. WELCOMING MISSION, PINOCHET MADE BLUNT PITCH FOR MORE TANGIBLE U.S. SUPPORT, SETTING A THEME THAT WAS TO RECUR CONSTANTLY IN COURSE OF TALKS.

3. FOUR LENGTHY WORKING SESSIONS WERE ALL AT CABINET AND ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF LEVEL, ATTENDED BY SERVICE CHIEFS BRAVO, LE MAY AND VAN SCHOUWEN, MINISTERS CARVAJAL (FOREIGN AFFAIRS), SAEZ (COORDINATION), LENIZ (ECON), CAUAS (FINANCE), KELLY (PLANNING), AND NUMEROUS SECOND-LEVEL OFFICIALS. ATMOSPHERE AT FIRST SESSION WAS PARTICULARLY FORMAL, FEATURING CHELEAN PRESENTATIONS ON STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC CONCERNS. USDEL REPLIED MORE CONVERSATIONALLY ON GENERAL U.S. POLICY APPROACH, DETENTE, MIDDLE EAST, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND OTHER BROAD POLITICAL TOPICS. FOLLOWING LUNCH HOSTED BY FOREIGN MINISTER, AFTERNOON SESSION DEVOTED TO FORMAL PRESENTATIONS BY CHILEAN MINISTERS ON CURRENT ECONOMIC POLICY WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON FOOD AND ENERGY INITIATIVES.

4. SESSION ON MORNING OF NOVEMBER 19 WAS BILLED BY CHILEANS AS RESTRICTED SESSION (I.E. SOME CIVILIAN OFFICIALS DID NOT ATTEND). IT WAS DEVOTED CONFIDENTIAL

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TO PRESENTATION BY CHILEAN MILITARY OF THE SOVIET-CUBAN AND PERUVIAN THREATS, PAINTED IN DARKEST POSSIBLE TERMS. (SEPTTEL ON PERU-CHILE.) CLOSING SESSION IN AFTERNOON PICKED UP EARLIER THEMES, AND PUNCTUATED BY FOREIGN MINISTER'S DIRECT REQUEST FOR ANSWER AS TO WHEN THEIR MILITARY EQUIPMENT REQUEST WOULD BE ANSWERED, PLUS PLEA FROM SAEZ FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY SUPPORT FOR CHILEAN REQUEST FOR LONG-TERM

DEBT RESCHEDULING. CHILEANS ALSO SOLICITED U.S. HELP IN BLUNTING GLOBAL COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST CHILE. USDEL REMINDED PARTICIPANTS THAT IT WAS NOT A NEGOTIATING MISSION; INDICATED OPTIMISM THAT POSITIVE REPLY ON DEFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING SOON; THAT ECONOMIC NEEDS WOULD BE CONSIDERED SYMPATHETICALLY; BUT STRESSED THAT COUNTERACTING PROPAGANDA WAS SOMETHING ONLY CHILEANS COULD DO THROUGH THEIR OWN ACTIONS.

5. FINAL SESSION ON AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 19 INCLUDED DETAILED CHILEAN PRESENTATION ON INTERNAL SECURITY THREAT AND CONTINUING TERRORIST ACTIVITY, INCLUDING TIES TO FOREIGN ELEMENTS (E.G. ERP IN ARGENTINA); DISPLAY OF CAPTURED SOVIET WEAPONS AND FRANK EXCHANGES ON POINTS PREVIOUSLY COVERED (PERU THREAT, REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF DETENTE, COMMUNIST THREAT IN LA, CHILE'S ECONOMIC NEEDS).

6. DESPITE INITIAL FORMALITY OF SETTING, LATTER WORKING SESSIONS AND INFORMAL ENCOUNTERS WERE CHARACTERIZED ON BOTH SIDES BY HIGH DEGREE OF FRANKNESS. EXCHANGES WERE AT TIMES HEATED, ESPECIALLY ON CHILEAN SIDE, WHICH SEEMED TO FEEL U.S. HAD NOT FULLY RECIPROCATED CHILEAN EFFORTS TO FIGHT GLOBAL COMMUNIST MENACE. CHILEANS SOUGHT CONSISTENTLY TO PORTRAY SELVES AS LOYAL ALLIES WILLING TO SUPPORT U.S. FULLY -- AND EXPECTING TANGIBLE SUPPORT IN RETURN.

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7. CHILEANS FEEL THEMSELVES UNDER THREEFOLD PRESSURE
(1) THREAT FROM PERU BACKED BY DIRECT SOVIET
SUPPORT; (2) GLOBAL COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN
COORDINATED WITH DOMESTIC TERRORIST THREAT, WHICH
SOME CHILEANS INCLUDING ARMY CHIEF BRAVO SAID MIGHT
TAKE ANOTHER YEAR TO BRING FULLY UNDER CONTROL AND
(3) ECONOMIC SQUEEZE RESULTING FROM YEARS OF MARXIST
MISMANAGEMENT AGGRAVATED INTERNATIONALLY BY RISING
PRICE OF OIL AND FALLING PRICE OF COPPER. THE STATE
OF SIEGE SYMBOLIZED PHYSICALLY BY CURFEWS IS ONLY
A PALE REFLECTION OF THE MENTAL STATE OF SIEGE
REFLECTED IN ATTITUDES OF CHILEAN LEADERS.

8. MILITARY LEADERS ASCRIBE CHILE'S DIPLOMATIC
ISOLATION SOLELY TO SUCCESSFUL COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION
OF SOFT-HEADED LIBERALISM OF WESTERN DEMOCRACIES
AND SEEM TO FEEL THAT INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION MOVES
TO BLUNT INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM WOULD ONLY
OPEN THE DOOR TO FURTHER SOVIET INSTIGATED TERRORISM.
AT BOTTOM, THEY SEEM TO EXPECT U.S. TO SOLVE THEIR
GLOBAL PROBLEMS FOR THEM WHILE THEY DEAL WITH
DOMESTIC OPPOSITION THROUGH RIGID POLICE METHODS
AND SEEK TO BRING ECONOMY INTO BALANCE.

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9. CIVILIAN ECONOMIC TEAM IS IMPRESSIVE IN ITS
OBVIOUS TALENTS AND CLEAR-HEADED DIAGNOSIS OF
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE
CARRYING OUT A COMPREHENSIVE REFORM OF CHILE'S
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, INCLUDING REALIGNMENT OF
RELATIVE PRICES AND THEIR STABILIZATION (PRICES
WILL INCREASE 360 PERCENT IN 1974), TAX REFORM,
DEVALUATION, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, AND DENATIONALI-
ZATION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR WHICH CONTINUES TO
DOMINATE THE ECONOMY. CHILE WILL NEED MASSIVE
COMPENSATORY FINANCING IN 1975 AND OTHER FINANCIAL
AID. ITS LEADERS ARE CONCERNED THAT HOSTILITY
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS HAS CARRIED OVER
INTO THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
FEAR THAT IT WILL AFFECT PARIS CLUB NEGOTIATIONS.
CHILEANS MADE STRONG PITCH TO U.S. FOR FINANCIAL
SUPPORT DURING THE CRISIS, UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR
DIFFICULT SITUATION WITH REGARD TO COPPER PRICES
AND THEIR ROLE IN CIPEC, AND TO SUPPORT THEIR REQUESTS
FOR 1975 DEBT RESCHEDULING AS WELL AS GIVE SYMPATHETIC

CONSIDERATION TO A LONG-TERM DEBT RESCHEDULING
EXERCISE IN 1976.

10. CHILEAN LEADERS SEEM TO HAVE LITTLE OR NO INTEREST
IN THE REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE NEW DIALOGUE, A
SUBJECT BARELY TOUCHED ON IN THE MEETINGS. THEY
ARE COMPLETELY ABSORBED BY THEIR INTERNAL AND
BILATERAL PROBLEMS AND WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THEM
TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY
OF THE REGION.

11. USDEL DEALT FRANKLY WITH HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM
WHEN APPROPRIATE, POINTING OUT THAT CONGRESSIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION COULD NOT BE IGNORED, THOUGH
WE AVOIDED PREACHING. RESPONSE WAS MINIMAL.

12. CHILEANS CONSISTENTLY PORTRAYED THEIR POSITION AS
ONE OF TRUE FRIEND OF U.S. WAGING DETERMINED BATTLE
AGAINST SOVIET CONSPIRACY IN HEMISPHERE, ATTEMPTING
TO BRING ORDER OUT OF ECONOMIC
CHAOS LEFT BY ALLENDE REGIME, AND, WITHIN THEIR
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CAPABILITY, OF SUPPORTING U.S. GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONCERNS.
THEY SAW TWELVE COUNTRIES WHO VOTED FOR LIFTING OAS
SANCTIONS AT QUITO AS DUPES OF SOVIETS, AND OBVIOUSLY
WERE WORRIED THA U.S. ALSO BEING INFECTED BY VIRUS.
PRESENTATIONS WERE IN STARK COLD WAR TERMS WITH
CLEAR UNDERTONE OF CONCERN THAT U.S. DETENTE POLICY
WAS GIVING RELATIELY FREE HAND TO SOVIETS, WHO
WERE USING CUBA AND PERU TO DESTROY CHILEAN GOVERNMENT
BECAUSE OF ITS DETERMINED STAND ON BEHALF OF THE WEST.
USDEL ATTEMPTS TO SOFTEN THIS UNRELENTINGLY BLACK
AND WHITE INTERPRETATION FOUND SOME RESPONSE AMONG
CIVILIANS, BUT SEEM TO FALL ON DEAF EARS AMONG
MILITARY. IN HIS SUMMATION, CARVAJAL REGRETTED
APPARENT FAILURE OF CHILEAN SIDE TO CONVINCE USDEL
OF IMMEDIACY OF PERUVIAN THREAT, AND OF REALITY OF
SOVIET MANIPULATION OF PERU. (DISPLAY OF SOVIET-
ORIGIN ARMS SEIZED FROM TERRORISTS THEN BROUGHT
FORTH TO PROVIDE GRAND FINALE TO FORMAL MEETINGS.)
USDEL EMPHASIZED THAT IT HAD GAINED MUCH BETTER
UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEMS FACED BY CHILE, THAT
DIFFERENCES IN INTERPRETATION OF SOME GLOBAL AND
LOCAL TRENDS DID NOT ALTER DETERMINED USG SUPPORT
FOR GOC, AND THAT SOVIET ACTIONS IN PERU AND ELSEWHERE
WOULD BE FOLLOWED WITH FULL AWARENESS OF CHILEAN CONCERSN.

13. IN SUM, TALKS CAN BE DESCRIBED AS SUCCESSFUL
EXCHANGE. CHILEANS WERE EXPOSED TO U.S. PARTICIPANTS

WERE EXPOSED IN UNIQUE MANNER TO A COMPREHENSIVE,
HIGH-LEVEL PICTURE OF CHILEAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE
WORLD. BOTH SIDES CAME AWAY WITH REALIZATION THAT
THERE ARE BROAD GAPS IN MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ARISING
FROM (1) DIFFERENCE BETWEEN U.S. GLOBAL VIEW AND
CHILEAN DOMESTIC REOCCUPATIONS; AND (2) MECHANISTIC COLD WAR
CONCEPTS OF CHILEAN MILITARY THAT REFLECT THINKING

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INFO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BRASILIA 8811

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OF TWENTY YEARS AGO, COMPARED TO EVOLUTION IN U.S.
THINKING THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN RESPONSE TO CHANGES
IN WORLD SITUATION. USDEL REPEATEDLY AND FORCEFULLY
ASSURED CHILEANS THAT OUR DETENTE POLICY TAKES FULL
ACCOUNT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AND THAT DETENTE WOULD
NOT BE PURSUED AT EXPENSE OF INTEREST OF CHILE OR
ANY OTHER U.S. FRIEND. ONE CHILEAN OFFICIAL (CLARO,
ECONOMIC ADVISER OF FOREIGN OFFICE) EXPRESSED HOPE
THAT U.S. WOULD SPEAK TO SOVIETS, IN DETENTE CONTEXT,
TO DISCOURAGE SOVIET MEDDLING IN LATIN AMERICA
(ESPECIALLY PERU.)

14. WHETHER TALKS CAN BE DESCRIBED AS POLITICAL
SUCCESS IS LESS CLEAR. CHILEAN DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMENTED AFTER MEETINGS ENDED HE HEARD TOO MUCH TALK
OF "COOPERATION", IMPLYING POSSIBILITY OF DIFFERENT
INTERESTS, RATHER THAN OF "COORDINATION", WHICH WOULD

HAVE IMPLIED IDENTITY OF INTERESTS. IT MAY TAKE SOME
TIME FOR CHILEANS TO DIGEST AMERICAN VIEW; WHETHER
THEY WILL INCORPORATE ANY OF IT IN THEIR OWN THINKING
IS QUESTIONABLE. CERTAINLY THEY REMAIN DISTURBED
BY U.S. FAILURE TO SEE THE WORLD IN THEIR OLD-STYLE,
CONFRONTATIONAL TERMS AND TO RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. AS
GENERAL PINOCHET SAID ON OPENING DAY, "WE HAVE BEEN
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BETTER ALLIES TO YOU THEN YOU HAVE BEEN TO US".

15. DESPITE THESE DIFFERENCES, HOWEVER, CHILEANS
WERE CLEARLY DELIGHTED THAT U.S. MISSION HAD COME.
THE HIGH LEVEL OF ATTENTION THEY GAVE IT REFLECTS
A STRONG DESIRE TO CAPITALIZE ON ANYTHING THAT
DEMONSTRATES THAT CHILE IS NOT COMPLETELY ISOLATED
IN THE WORLD. THE DIGNITY WITH WHICH BOTH SIDES
CONDUCTED THEMSELVES LEFT THE PROMISE OF A CONTINUED
SEARCH FOR BETTER MUTUAL COMPREHENSION.
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